Abstract-Despite its intrinsic linearity, compressed sensing may be exploited to at least partially encrypt acquired signals from unintentional receivers: in the companion paper we have shown that the simplicity of its encoding allows the definition of a general, lightweight scheme in which transmitters distribute the same information to receivers of different classes enabled to recover it with different quality levels.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HIS paper elaborates on the possibility of exploiting Compressed Sensing (CS) [1] , [2] not only to reduce the resource requirements for the acquisition of certain signal classes, but also to encode the acquired data so that the information collected by CS is hidden from unauthorized receivers. The general scheme presented in [3] improves on some preliminary studies [4] - [7] and applications [8] showing that, although the encoding performed by CS cannot be regarded as perfectly secure, practical encryption is still provided at almost-zero cost. When used as an acquisition scheme, CS is therefore able to embed security properties within the process of sampling at the analog-to-digital interface.
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signal only under some assumptions [9] and by specialized decoding algorithms [10] - [12] .
These algorithms rely on the exact knowledge of the subspace on which the signal was projected. If this information is completely missing, the original signal is unrecoverable. On the other hand, if the subspace is only partially known, the signal is approximately recoverable from its linear measurements but affected by a degradation which strongly increases with the amount of missing information on the projection subspace. Hence, this subspace (or its partial description) may be seen as the secret key which is distributed to the intended receivers, enabling them to recover the original signal with different quality levels.
In fact, although the decoding process is partially resilient to certain types of perturbations and basis mismatches [13] - [15] a controlled amount of equivalent noise at unintended receivers causes poor reconstruction performances, thus allowing a multiclass scheme where high-class users are able to recover high-quality information, and lower-class users recover only a low-quality approximation of the original signal.
This encryption scheme may be beneficial to acquisition systems within the rising framework of wireless sensor networks [16] where large amounts of data are locally acquired by sensor nodes with extremely tight resources and must be transmitted, e.g., to a remote central node for further processing. When transmission security is an issue, physicallayer techniques that help balancing the trade-off between encryption strength and required resources may offer an attractive design alternative to the deployment of separate, alldigital conventional encryption stages.
In order to take advantage of this scheme, its robustness must be quantitatively characterized w.r.t. possible attacks. The theoretical and empirical evidence provided in [3] dealt with an elementary form of attack, i.e., a straightforward statistical analysis of the CS measurements.
In this paper we address the robustness of CS w.r.t. KnownPlaintext Attacks (KPAs), i.e., to situations in which a malicious eavesdropper has gained access to an instance of the original signal (plaintext) and the corresponding CS measurements (ciphertext), and from this piece of information tries to infer the corresponding encoding matrix. Potentially, KPAs are more threatening than attacks solely based on observing the ciphertext. Yet, we will show how the proposed approach exhibits a noteworthy level of robustness w.r.t. this class of attacks due to the nature of the encoding process.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we briefly review the multiclass encryption scheme in the particular but significant two-class case, in which we distinguish between first-class receivers authorized to reconstruct the signal with full quality and second-class receivers enabled to reconstruct the signal with reduced decoding quality.
Section III describes KPAs as delivered by eavesdroppers and second-class receivers who aim at improving the quality of their signal recovery. We will perform KPAs on each row of the encoding matrix by mapping them into classical combinatorial problems, and show that the number of candidate rows compatible with a typical plaintext-ciphertext pair is enormous, thus implying that finding the true one among this huge solution set is practically infeasible.
In Section IV these KPAs are exemplified for three signal classes: segments of speech, electrocardiographic tracks (ECG) and images including sensitive text content. For all these cases we give empirical evidence on how the encoding matrices guessed by KPA perform poorly when trying to decode any incoming ciphertext.
After the Conclusion, the Appendices report the proofs of the Propositions and Theorems given in Section III.
II. A TWO-CLASS ENCRYPTION SCHEME
The encryption mechanism we will attack is based on a straightforward adjustment of classical Compressed Sensing (CS) [1] , [2] , in which a signal represented by a vector x ∈ R n is acquired by applying a linear, dimensionality-reducing mapping A : R n → R m (i.e., the encoding matrix) to generate the measurement vector y = Ax, y ∈ R m . The encoding matrix A is chosen to allow the recovery of x from y even if m < n by using the fact that x is known to be sparse in a proper basis or dictionary D, i.e., that it can be written as x = Ds where s ∈ R p for some p ≥ n but the number of non-zero entries in s is k p for any instance of x. The results presented in this paper are independent of D, which may be considered a basis (i.e. p = n) for the sake of simplicity.
A proper design of A must obey some mathematical conditions that we assume verified throughout this paper [17] , [18] . The most relevant fact is that when A is a typical realization of a random matrix with independent and identically distributed entries following a subgaussian distribution, we are reassured that signal recovery is not only possible but somehow easy. In fact, mathematically grounded algorithms exists for which reconstruction guarantees can be given [10] , along with an ever-growing plethora of fast, iterative methods capable of reconstructing x starting from y, A and D.
In the following we will concentrate on operators A that are realizations of a Bernoulli random matrix [19] which are ideal candidates to be generated, stored, and processed by digital devices. Since the knowledge of A is necessary in the reconstruction of x from y and any error in its entries reflects on the quality of the reconstructed signal, the multiclass encryption system proposed in [3] looks at x as the plaintext, y as the ciphertext and the linear transformation operated by A as the encryption algorithm. Since A is generated from a pseudorandom symbol source expanded from an initial seed, we define the latter our private encryption key or shared secret between the CS encoder and the intended receivers.
More formally and restricting ourselves to a two-class scheme, a first sequence of matrices . In parallel, a sequence of subsets
. . , n − 1} is obtained by pseudorandom expansion of a seed Key C (0) . We introduce a second sequence of matrices {A (1),l } l∈N whose generic element A (1) is obtained from the corresponding
with the subset C
indicating which entries of A (0) must be inverted to obtain A (1) . We consider a fixed cardinality c for every generic subset C (0) and define η = c /mn the sign flipping density.
All the aforementioned sequences will depend on keys with a finite number of bits and thus will eventually repeat. In the following, we will assume that the period of the sequences generated by algorithmic expansion of the keys (e.g., by a pseudorandom number generator, PRNG) is sufficiently long as to guarantee that in a typical observation time of practical interest all elements in the sequence will never occur twice. With this hypothesis, we let
be generic, unique elements of the aforementioned sequences, which will be implicitly considered from now on.
Given any plaintext x, the corresponding ciphertext y is produced as y = A (1) x, A
being the true encoding. Twoclass encryption is achieved by distributing Key A only to first-class receivers, all the other being implicitly second-class receivers. In fact, when a ciphertext y is communicated, receivers knowing both Key A (0) and Key C (0) are able to rebuild the corresponding A (1) used in the encoding process and reconstruct the plaintext x with full quality from its recovered sparse coefficients s.
On the other hand, second-class receivers may only rebuild A (0) from their available information. For 0 < η 1 such a matrix is an approximation of the corresponding A (1) , thus allowing signal recovery with lower quality than that achieved by first-class receivers.
Any receiver not knowing Key A
has no information on the encoding matrix and is consequently unable to recover x, which remains completely hidden.
In [3] we have characterized the effectiveness of this scheme in protecting information against eavesdroppers trying to compensate their ignorance of the key by means of straightforward statistical analysis of the ciphertext. In fact, if
is a Bernoulli random matrix, the same can be said of A (1) since the statistics of its equiprobable antipodal symbols are unaltered by the sign flipping patterns C (0) used to build the latter from the former. Hence, the measurement vectors y are statistically indistinguishable from those that would have been produced by encoding the same plaintext x with A (0) instead of A (1) : if a second-class receiver wanted to improve its quality reconstruction by means of sheer statistical analysis on y, it would face the same odds of a pure eavesdropper completely ignoring the key.
In view of quantifying the robustness of this scheme, we must also consider hostile situations where an attacker is able to gather additional information on the mechanism in terms of a given, known value of the plaintext x corresponding to a ciphertext y. Based on these priors, the attacker aims at computing the true encoding A (1) such that y = A (1) x. In the following we will consider a known-plaintext attack by assuming that only one (x, y) pair is known for a certain A (1) , consistently with the hypothesis that A (1) is never reused in the encoding process 1 . This type of attack gives rise to different strategies whether the attacker knows nothing except the (x, y) pair (a pure eavesdropper that we will call Eve) or it is a second-class receiver knowing also the partially correct encoding A (we will call this malicious second-class user Steve and its KPA class-upgrade).
III. KNOWN-PLAINTEXT ATTACKS
For the sake of simplicity, we characterize KPAs on a single row of A (1) . The actual breaking of the encryption protocol would entail iterating the following computations for all the rows of each of the matrices in the sequence, thus requiring an even larger effort than the one described below.
A. Eavesdropper's Known-Plaintext Attack
Given a plaintext x and the corresponding ciphertext y = A (1) x we now assume the perspective of Eve and attempt to recover the j-th row of A (1) with a set of antipodal symbols
Since the attacks must rely on the knowledge of x and y, it is sensible to assume that both plaintexts and ciphertexts are represented by digital words. Hence, we assume
Note that x k = 0 is excluded since each corresponding summand would give no contribution to the sum (1), thus makingÂ
an undetermined variable in the attack.
k=0 be a set of n positive integers and υ a positive integer. We define subsetsum problem (SSP) [20, Chap. 4 ] the problem of assigning n binary variables b k ∈ {0, 1}, k = 0, . . . , n − 1 such that
We define solution any {b k } n−1 k=0 verifying (2). 1 Note that if much more information is available, e.g., if n independent (x, y) pairs were known for the same A (1) , one could resort to elementary linear algebra to infer the exact encoding matrix by solving a simple linear system. is equivalent to a SSP where
j of the true encoding matrix and thus indicated as the true solution. The density of this SSP is defined as
The derivation of this SSP is reported in Appendix A. Although in general a SSP is NP-complete, not all of its instances are equally hard. In fact, it is known that high density instances (i.e., δ(n, L) > 1) have plenty of solutions found or approximated by e.g. dynamic programming, whereas low density instances are harder, although for special cases polynomial-time algorithms have also been found [21] .
It is worth noting that low density, hard SSP instances have been used in cryptography to develop the family of public-key knapsack cryptosystems [22] , [23] although most have been broken with polynomial-time algorithms [24] .
In our case the density (3) is high since n is large and log 2 L is fixed by the digital representation of x (e.g., log 2 L ≤ 64). We are therefore exploiting a different region of the problem space. In fact, the robustness of CS to KPAs is not due to the hardness of the corresponding SSP but, as we show in this section, to the astronomically large number of candidate solutions as n increases, among which one should cluelessly find the true solution {b k } n−1 k=0 to break a single row of A (1) .
The following theorem provides an average on the number of solutions of the SSP in Proposition 1 and is an application of the theory developed in [25] .
Theorem 1 (Expected number of solutions for Eve's KPA). For large n, the expected number of solutions of a random instance of the SSP in Proposition 1, in which all the coefficients {u k } n−1 k=0 are uniformly drawn from {1, . . . , L} and the true solution {b k } n−1 k=0 has uniformly distributed and independent binary values is
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Appendix A. This theorem (as well as the whole statistical mechanics framework from which it is derived) gives no hint on how much the asymptotic trend is representative of finite-n behaviors. To at least partially compensate for that, we enumerated the solutions of several small-scale problems and verified that even in those cases the asymptotic expression of (4) can be used to effectively estimate the average number of indistinguishable solutions to the problem in Proposition 1. Such numerical evidence is reported in Fig. 1 , where the averages over 50 random SSP instances with L = 10 4 and n = 16, . . . , 32 are plotted and compared with the asymptotic trend.
The remarkable matching we observe allows us to confidently estimate, for example, that a KPA to the encoding of a grayscale image of n = 64 × 64 pixels quantized with 1 + log 2 L = 8 bits (unsigned) would have to discriminate on the average between 1.25 · 10 1229 equally good solutions for each of the rows of the matrix under attack. Note that this number is not far from the total number of possible rows that is 2 4096 = 1.04 · 10
1233
. Hence, any attacker using this strategy is faced with a deluge of possible solutions, from which it would choose the one presumed to be a piece of the encoding matrix to attempt the decoding of future, unknown plaintexts.
A legitimate concern when the attacker is presented with such an enormous number of candidate solutions to the SSP in Proposition 1 is that most of them could be good approximations of the true encoding matrix A (1) . To see whether this is the case or not, we now quantify the difference between the j-th row of A (1) and the corresponding row resulting from a KPA in terms of their Hamming distance, i.e. the number of entries in which they differ.
Theorem 2 (Expected number of KPA solutions with a given Hamming distance from the true one). For large n, the expected number of solutions S (h) Eve (n, L) at Hamming distance h from the true solution of the SSP in Proposition 1 is
where P h (L) is a polynomial in L whose coefficients are reported in Table I for h = 2, . . . , 15.
The proof of this Theorem is reported in Appendix B. As before, to partially compensate for the unavailability of a guarantee on the rate of convergence, we collect some empirical evidence on the fact that the asymptotic expression in (5) may be used for finite n. Figure 2 reports for n = 21, 23, . . . , 31 the average over 50 trials of the number of solutions to Eve's KPA whose Hamming distance from the true one is a given value h = 2, . . . , 15.
The remarkable matching we observe allows us to confidently estimate, for example, that in the previously exemplified case of a grayscale image (n = 4096, L = 128) only 1.57·10 
Empirical average number of solutions for Eve's KPA whose Hamming distance from the true one is h, compared to the theoretical approximation of (5) for L = 10 4 and n = 21, 23, . . . , 31.
Since these results apply to each row of the matrix being inferred, these numbers clearly indicate that the chance for a randomly selected solution among those produced by a KPA to be the true key is totally negligible.
B. Class-upgrade Known-Plaintext Attack
A known-plaintext attack may also be attempted by Steve, a second-class receiver aiming to improve its signal recovery performances with the intent of reaching the same quality of a first-class receiver.
In this KPA, a partially correct encoding matrix A
is also known in addition to x and y. With this prior Steve may
is a matrix with ternary entries in {−2, 0, 2} that are non-null only in c cases. Hence, Steve performs a KPA by searching for a set of ternary symbols {∆A j,k } n−1 k=0 such that
of which it is known that ∆A j,k = 0 only in c cases. Moreover, to ease the solution of this problem and make it row-wise separable we assume that Steve has access to an even more accurate information, i.e., the exact number c j of non-zero entries in the j-th row of ∆A, that is the number of sign flips bringing the j-th row of A
into the corresponding row of A (1) -obviously, it must be m−1 j=0 c j = c. By assuming this, we may prove the equivalence between Steve's KPA to each row of A (1) and a slightly adjusted SSP.
Definition 2 (γ-cardinality Subset-Sum Problem). Let {u k } n−1 k=0 be a set of n positive integers, υ and γ ∈ [1, n] positive integers. We define γ-cardinality subset-sum problem (γ-SSP) the problem of assigning n binary variables b k ∈ {0, 1}, 
We define solution any {b k } n−1 k=0 verifying (7)∧(8). Proposition 2. The class-upgrade KPA to the j-th row of A (1) , assuming that it differs from the corresponding row of a known A
In [25] the constrained SSP case is obtained as an extension of the results on the unconstrained SSP, from which we obtain the following theorem whose proof is reported in Appendix C.
Theorem 3 (Expected number of solutions for the class-upgrade KPA). The expected number of solutions of a random instance of the c j -SSP in Proposition 2 is
with r = cj /n the row-density of perturbations.
The number of solutions found by Steve is by many orders of magnitude smaller than Eve's KPA solutions, the intrinsic reason being that Steve requires much less information in order to achieve complete knowledge of the true encoding A (1) . In order to provide numerical evidence on this theorem we resume the simulations of Section III-A by adding the equality constraint of the c j -SSP (8) . The simulations are performed for n = 20, . . . , 32 (except the first case, whose computation is still feasible for n = 48), L = 10 4 and a row-density of perturbations r = 5 /n, 10 /n, 15 /n on a set of 50 random instances of the problem. The empirical average number of solutionsŜ Steve (n, L, r) reported in Fig. 3 is always greater or equal than the theoretical value in (9); note that the approximation is increasingly accurate as n → ∞.
Resuming the previous example, our n = 64 × 64 pixels grayscale image quantized at 8 bit and encoded with two-class CS using a perturbation ∆A with r = 0.03 will have on the average 1.25 · 10 235 candidate solutions of indistinguishable quality.
The previous analysis hinges on a counting argument in a general setting, without any other prior assumption on the structure of A (1) or ∆A. The class-upgrade attack has been examined by assuming very accurate prior information on the number of perturbations per row, thus implying a best-case situation for the attacker. Notably, as we will show in the following experiments, these attacks yield no advantage in terms reconstruction performances to unintended receivers.
Obviously, as further prior information becomes available (for example the knowledge that the unknown matrices ∆A are low-rank entities [26] or that the original signal distributes its energy in a non-uniform way [27] , [28] ) revealing the hidden information may become easier. Yet, this is true for any private key scheme in which either the key or the plaintext have a nonuniform distribution and is out of the scope of this analysis.
IV. APPLICATION EXAMPLES
In this Section we exemplify the complexity of knownplaintext attacks in a practical common framework. In particular, when Eve is performing a KPA she knows a plaintextciphertext pair (x , y ) and attacks a matrix A (1) row by row: the j-th row A (1) j is inferred by iteratively generating random instances of a Bernoulli row until an instanceÂ (1) j is found such that y j =Â (1) j x . This random search approach is preferable to the solution of the corresponding subset-sum problem for two reasons. First, it is known from Theorem 1 that the expected number of solutions is very large and thus the probability of success of random trials is far from being negligible while their computational cost is very low. Second, the existing theoretical guarantees that x can be retrieved from y despite the dimensionality reduction work when A (1) is a typical (in the mathematical sense) realization of a Bernoulli random matrix. On the contrary, combinatorial solvers tend to explore solutions in a systematic way, and while crucial in the brute-force enumeration of all possible solutions as in Section III (with computational cost growing exponentially in n) they tend to generate highly structured solution sets that contain clearly non-typical rows of a Bernoulli random matrix with no chance of it being the true encoding matrix.
To test the inferredÂ (1) Eve may pretend to ignore x and recover its approximationx from y by using a standard min 1 decoding algorithm, SPGL 1 [29] . In this setting we measure the accuracy of the resulting reconstruction as the Reconstruction Signal-to-Noise Ratio, RSNR = 10 log 10
2 , which will be the only indicator of the quality of the candidate solutionÂ (1) obtained from the available information.
Then, Eve attempts the decoding of a measurement vector y that is encoded with the same matrix used for y and reconstructs a signalx satisfying y =Â The examples of class-upgrade KPAs follow the same procedure as those performed by Eve with the exception that Steve generates the rows of A (1) by random search of the index set C to the j-th row of A (1) . Coherently with the theoretical setting of Section III-B, we will assume that Steve knows exactly how many entries are flipped in each row. In this case, we will show how the (RSNR , RSNR ) pairs distribute when a large number of KPAs is performed. The simulation framework reproducing these tests is available at http://securecs.googlecode.com.
A. Speech Signals
As in [3] we consider a subset of spoken English sentences from the PTDB-TUG database [30] with original sampling (9) for L = 10 4 with row-density of perturbations r = 5 /n, 10 /n, 15 /n. frequency f s = 48 kHz, windowed in two fragments x , x of n = 512 samples whose encoding yields the measurements y , y each of dimensionality m = 256. Reconstruction is made possible with a sparsity basis D synthesized by principal component analysis on the dataset [31] . In order to reduce the computational burden of randomly searching KPA solutions, we assume that the speech fragments are quantized at 8 bit.
In this setting, we generate 2000 candidate solutionsÂ (1) to both Eve and Steve's KPA and test their goodness as aforementioned. The procedure returns the results in Fig. 4 : while both malicious users are able to reconstruct the known plaintext x with a relatively high average RSNR ≈ 26 dB since their KPAs yield solutions to y =Â (1) x , on the second window of samples x and for allÂ (1) both the attackers are faced with performances matching their respective information on the true encoding A (1) . The eavesdropper attains an average RSNR ≈ −0.37 dB, whereas the second-class decoder achieves an average RSNR ≈ 6.88 dB compatible with the effect of a sign flipping density η = 0.03 between A (0) and A (1) as observed in [3] . While it is clear that Eve (Fig. 4a) will not be able to reach significant decoding performances since most cases are well below a signal-to-noise ratio of 1 dB, Steve (Fig. 4b ) observes in about one half of the cases a modest RSNR improvement w.r.t. the nominal second-class RSNR = 6.83 dB (i.e. when reconstructing x from the sole A (0) and y ), while the other half is symmetrically distributed below it. This implies that his best move on the average is always using the provided, partially correct encoding matrix rather than attempting classupgrade.
Furthermore, sign flipping sets C
improving Steve's reconstruction quality may not be identified by looking at the RSNR , since the correlation coefficient between RSNR and RSNR is only 0.0101. Thus, Steve cannot rely on the information he has to spot best performing solutions, implying that class-upgrade KPAs are doomed to fail.
B. Electrocardiographic Signals
As in [3] , we now consider ECG signals from the MIT PhysioNet database [32] sampled at f s = 250 Hz and encoded from windows x , x of n = 250 samples to measurement vectors y , y with m = 90 entries. Decoding is allowed by the sparsity level of the windowed signal when decomposed on a discrete Gabor time-frequency dictionary D [33] of p = 1440 atoms.
Assuming that the ECGs are represented by 12 bit samples, we generate 2000 candidate solutions for both Eve and Steve's KPA, obtaining the reconstruction performances of Fig. 5 . Similarly to the previous example, both users reconstruct the known plaintext x with an average RSNR ≈ 23 dB (their KPAs yielding solutions to y =Â (1) x ), while on the second window of samples x the eavesdropper achieves an average RSNR ≈ −2.04 dB (Fig. 5a ) and the second-class decoder achieves an average RSNR ≈ 6.88 dB (Fig. 5b) when the encryption protocol is set to a sign flipping density η = 0.03 between A (0) and A (1) . In this case, the nominal second-class RSNR = 7.43 dB when reconstructing x from y with A (0) , while the correlation coefficient between RSNR and RSNR is −0.0018; these figures clearly highlight the ineffectiveness of KPAs at inferring A (1) in this case.
C. Sensitive Text in Images
In this example we consider the same test images used in [3] , i.e., 640 × 512 pixel grayscale images of people holding a printed identification text concealed by means of multiclass encryption. To reduce the computational burden of KPAs we assume a block size of 64 × 64 pixel, 8 bit/pixel and encode the resulting n = 4096 pixels into m = 2048 measurements. Signal recovery is performed by assuming the blocks have a sparse representation along a 2D Daubechies-4 wavelet basis [33] . Multiclass encryption is applied on the blocks containing the printed text, so that first and second-class decoding will differ solely by the concealed sensitive information.
For this test we choose two adjacent blocks x , x containing some letters and encoded with the same matrix; the first-class decoder is able to reconstruct x with a nominal RSNR = 28.02 dB, while the second-class decoder only achieves RSNR = 8.80 dB on the same block due to the flipping of c = 251658 entries (corresponding to a perturbation density η = 0.03) in the encoding matrix. In order to test Eve and Steve's KPA we randomly generate 2000 solutions for the j-th row of the encoding given x , y : it is worth noting that while in the previous cases the signal dimensionality is sufficiently small to produce a solution set in less than two minutes, in this case generating a set of 2000 different solutions for a single row may take up to several hours for very hard instances.
By using the KPA solutions to reconstruct x , x we obtain the results of Figure 6 : while both users attain an average RSNR ≈ 27 dB on x , Eve is only capable of reconstructing x with an average RSNR ≈ 0.49 dB where Steve reaches an average RSNR ≈ 8.75 dB with η = 0.03.
Note also that, although some lucky guesses exist with RSNR > 8.75 dB, it is impossible to identify them by looking at RSNR since the correlation coefficient between RSNR and RSNR is only 0.0012. Therefore, Steve cannot Effectiveness of (a) Eve and (b) Steve's KPA in recovering a hidden ECG. Each point is a guess of the encoding matrix A (1) whose quality is assessed by decoding the ciphertext y corresponding to the known plaintext x (RSNR ) and by decoding a new ciphertext y (RSNR ). The Euclidean distance from the average (RSNR , RSNR ) is highlighted by color gradient.
rely on observing the RSNR to choose the best performing solutionÂ (1) , so both Eve and Steve's KPAs are doomed to fail.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have thoroughly analyzed known-plaintext attacks as they may be carried out on standard CS schemes with Bernoulli random encoding matrices as well as on the particular multiclass CS protocol developed in [3] , which embeds encryption properties in the acquisition process by relying on the necessity of signal recovery to reconstruct the original message. In particular, the analysis was carried out from the two perspectives of an eavesdropper and a secondclass user trying to guess the true encoding matrix.
In both cases we have mapped multiclass CS into a collection of subset-sum problems with the aim of counting the number of solutions (i.e., candidate encoding matrices) matching a given plaintext-ciphertext pair. In the eavesdropper case we have found that for each row the expected number of solutions of this combinatorial problem grows as O(n
, thus implying an enormous number of solutions even for small-scale problems -finding the true solution among such astronomically large sets is like finding a needle in a haystack.
A further study of the solutions at a given Hamming distance from the true one showed that, as the dimensionality n increases, the expected number of solutions close to the true one is only a small fraction of the solution set.
As for the second-class user we have shown that depending on the available, partial information on the true encoding matrix, the known-plaintext attack to any of its rows can be mapped to a subset-sum problem with an expected number of solutions significantly smaller than the pure eavesdropper case, yet sufficiently high for large n to reassure that a second-class user will not be able to perform class-upgrade.
Finally, we show some simulated cases of known-plaintext attacks on real-world signals (speech, ECG traces and images). Since brute-force solution enumeration is computationally intractable (even for small-dimensional signals) we have carried out a random search for a solution set of a realistic plaintextciphertext pair, and afterwards tested whether any of the returned candidate encoding matrices could lead to breaking the true encoding on a successive ciphertext.
In all the observed cases, we have found that min 1 decoding performances of the candidates match the RSNR level prescribed by the encryption protocol devised in [3] , i.e., both malicious users are unable to successfully decode other instances with significant and stable quality improvements w.r.t. their available prior information. 
and let τ = υ /nL, τ ∈ [0, 
log(1+e
The average of S Eve (τ, n, L) in τ depends on the probability of selecting each possible value of υ ∈ [0, 2 ]. Since υ is the result of a linear combination structurally identical to the solutions of (2) the probability that a specific value appears in a random instance of this SSP is proportional to the number of solutions associated to it. In normalized terms, the PDF of τ must be proportional to S Eve (τ, n, L) and thus must be: Overall, the average number of solutions to the SSP in Proposition 1 is:
Although we could resort to numerical integration (12) can be simplified by noting that S Eve (τ, n, L) has an approximately Gaussian profile in τ (Fig. 7) with a maximum in τ = 1 /4 and variance σ 2 (n, L) vanishing as n → ∞. Hence, we may approximate
where we have exploited a( 1 4 ) = 0 to obtain the approximation reported in the statement of the theorem, whose accuracy improves with n log 2 L.
APPENDIX B HAMMING DISTANCE OF KPA SOLUTIONS Proof of Theorem 2:
By using the equivalence in Proposition 1 we concentrate on counting the number of solutions {b k } n−1 k=0 to the SSP that differ from {b k } n−1 k=0 by exactly h components, i.e., at Hamming distance h.
Assume that K ⊆ {0, . . . , n − 1} is the set of indexes for which there is a disagreement, i.e., is such that for any k ∈ K we have b k = 1 −b k . The set K has cardinality h and there are 
Though (14) recalls the well-known partition problem, in our case, once K is chosen, each instance of the original problem randomly sets the u j and theb j , so that (14) holds with a probability that depends on how many of the (2L) h possible assignments of the u j and theb j satisfy it. The only feasible cases are for h > 1 and to analyze them we may assume K = {0, . . . , h − 1} without loss of generality.
Note that whenever (14) holds for certain {b k } n−1 k=0 it also holds with the same {u k } n−1 k=0 and with {1 −b k } n−1 k=0 instead of {b k } n−1 k=0 . Hence, we may concentrate on configurations in whichb 0 = 0 knowing that their number will be half of the total number of configurations for which (14) holds. If this is done, and if h < L all the configurations in whichb k = 1 for at least one k > 0 are able to satisfy (14) for a total of 2 h−1 − 1 possibilities. With this in mind we can proceed to the explicit computation for h = 2 and h = 3.
For h = 2, one has only one feasible assignment for the {b k } n−1 k=0 and must also ensure u 0 = u 1 in (14) . This makes a total of 2L cases out of 4L 2 . For h = 3, one has 3 feasible assignments for the {b k } n−1 k=0 . Due to the symmetry of (14) all the configurations have the same behavior and we may focus on e.g.b 0 =b 1 = 0 andb 2 = 1, i.e., u 0 + u 1 = u 2 that is satisfied whenever
configurations. This makes a total of 3L(L−1) times over the 8L 3 possible cases. For h > 3 things get much more complicated but we may rely on the fact that the function P h (L) counting the number of configurations for which (14) holds is a polynomial in L of degree h − 1. To show this, let us proceed in three steps.
1) Assume that some {b k } n−1 k=0 are set, and indicate with πb the subspace in the variables {u k } n−1 k=0 identified by (14) .
Both αb(L) and βb(L) are (h−1)-dimensional polytopes and the number of integer points in αb(L) is equal to the number of integer points in the interior of βb(L) since points on the frontier of βb(L) have at least one coordinate that is either 0 or L + 1.
h scales linearly with L + 1 while πb is a subspace and therefore scale-invariant. Hence, their intersection βb(L) scales proportionally to the integer L + 1 as required by Ehrhart's theorem [34] . The number Eb(L) of integer points in βb(L) is a polynomial in L + 1, and thus in L, of degree equal to the dimensionality of βb(L), i.e., h − 1. From EhrhartMacdonald's reciprocity theorem [35] we also know that, since αb(L) is the interior of βb(L), the number of integer points in the former is (−1) h−1 Eb(−L), that is also a polynomial in L of degree h − 1. h ∩ πb ∩ πb . The same argument we used above tells us that the number of integer points in such an intersection is a polynomial in L of degree h − 2 and, in general that the number of integer points in the intersection of any number of αb(L) polytopes is a polynomial of degree not larger than h − 1.
3) The number of configurations of {u k } n−1 k=0 and {b k } n−1 k=0 that satisfy (14) is the number of integer points in the union of all possible polytopes αb, i.e., {b k } n−1 k=0 αb(L). Such a number can be computed by the inclusionexclusion principle that amounts to properly summing and subtracting the number of integer points in those polytopes and their various intersections. Since sum and subtraction of polynomials yield polynomials of non-increasing degree, we know that number is the evaluation of a polynomial P h (L) with degree not greater than h − 1. Assume F p (a, b) and G p (a, b) as in (10), (11) . Define the normalized constraint r = cj /n and two quantities a(τ, r) and b(τ, r) that are the solutions of the following system of equalities that are equivalent to [25, (5.8-9) ] with our notation. Define also:
Let us set

Proof of Theorem 3:
G(τ, r) = G 0 (a (τ, r) , b (τ, r)) G 1 (a (τ, r) , b (τ, r) G 1 (a (τ, r) , b (τ, r) G 2 (a (τ, r) , b (τ, r))
With these definitions, [25] proves that the number of solu- Using the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 1, we average on τ to reproduce (12) for the computation of E τ [S Steve (τ, n, L, r)]. Since S Steve (τ, n, L, r) has an approximately Gaussian profile in τ with a maximum in τ = r /2 and variance σ 2 (n, L, r) vanishing as n → ∞ we may again approximate the expectation in τ , 
